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1. Introduction
The use of computer-based systems and lnternet has been undergoing dramatic growth in $8cale$, vari-
ety and penetration, implying our growing dependence on them for a large number of businesses and
$day- t\triangleright day$ life services. Unfortunately, the complexity, the heterogeneity and the openness of the sup-
porting infrastructures to untrusted users have also given rise to an increasing number of vulnerabilities
and malicious threats (viruses, worms, denial of service attacks, fishing attempts, etc.). For malicious
attackers, if the access right strengthens, the probability that the security intrusion may happen will
effectively decrease, but the utilization on accessibUity will be rather lost. The claesical security-related
work has traditionally privileged, with a few exceptions, intrusion avoidance techniques (vulnerability
elimination, strong authentication, etc.) and attack deterrence (attack tracing, auditing, etc.). However,
such techniques have proved to be not sufficient to ensure the security of systems connected to networks.
More recently, intrusion tolerance techniques, inspired from traditional techniques commonly used for
tolerating accidental faults in hardware $and/or$ software systems, have received considerable attention
to complement intrusion avoidance techniques, and improve the security of systems connected to the
Internet. So far, most efforts in security have been focused on specification, design and implementation
issues. In fact several implementation techniques of intrusion toleranoe at the architecture level have
been developed for real computer-based systems such as distributed systems [1], database systems $[6,7]$ ,
middleware $[15,16]$ , server systems [2]. The above implementation approaches are based on the redundant
design at the architecture level on secure software systems. In other words, since these methods can
be categorized by a design diversity technique in secure system design and need much cost for the
development, the effect on implementation has to be evaluated carefully and quantitatively.
The quantitative evaluation of information security based on modeling is becoming much popular to
validate the effectiveness of computer-based systems with intrusion tolerance. Littlewood et $d$. $[5]$ found
the analogy between the information security theory and the traditional reliability theory in aesessing
the quantitative security of operational software systems, and explored the feasibility of probabilistic
quantMcation on security. Jonsson and Olovsson [4] gave a quantitative method to study the attacker’s
behavior with the empirical data observed in experiments. Ortalo, Deswarte and Kaaniche [11] applied the
privilege graph and the $continuoll\triangleright time$ Markov chain (CTMC) to evaluate the system vulnerability, and
derived the mean effort to security failure. Singh, Cukier and Sanders [12] designed stochastic activity
networks model for probabilistic validation of security and performance of several intrusion tolerant
architectures. Stevens et al. [13] also proposed probabilistic methods to model the DPASA (Designing
Protection and Adaptation into a Survivable Architecture).
On the other hand, it would be quite effective to apply the traditional $Markov/semi$-Markov modeling
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approaches to design the state transition diagram of system security states by incorporating both attacker
and system behaviors under uncertainty. Madan et al. [9] dealt with an architecture with intrusion
tolerance, called SITAR (Scalable Intrusion Tolerant Architecture) and described the stochastic behavior
of the system by discrete-time semi-Markov chain (DTSMC). They also derived analytically the mean
time length to security failure. Imaizumi, Kimura and Yasui [3] and Uemura and Dohi [14] focused on
the typical denial of service attacks for server systems and formulated the optimization problems on
the optimal monitoring time and the optimal patch management policy via continuoll&time semi-Markov
chain (CTSMC) models. Although they mainly considered the expected cost models which are familiar to
the $Markov/semi$-Markov analyses, the relationship with security attributes vas still unclear in modeling.
For the purpose of comprehensive modeling of system-level security quantification, it is actually diffi-
cult to model certain security attributes such as confidentiality and $intq|\dot{\tau}ty$ using the probabilistic tech-
niques as well as to quantify the high-level security requirement with different security attributes [10].
Hence, the measurement techniques for model parameterization and validation must be carefully selected
in security evaluation. In such a situation, the $s$urvivabtity analysis is becoming very common to quantify
the computer-based systems under the assumption that failure may occur and that the outcome of the
failure negatively impacts a large segment of the subscribers to the IT inbastructure, where such failures
may be the result of deliberate, malicious attacks against the inbastructure by an adversary.
In this paper we consider the secure design of an intrusion tolerant database (ITDB) system with a
control parameter, and describe the stochastic behavior of an intrusion tolerant database system (ITDB).
First, Liu et al. $[6,7]$ proposed several ITDB architectures and presented the design and implementation
$methodo\log i\infty$ . While traditional secure databaee systems rely on preventive controls and are very limited
in surviving malicious attacks, the ITDB can detect intrusions and isolate attacks. In addition, it can
contain, essess and repair the damage caused by intrusions in a timely manner such that sustained, self-
stabilzed levels of data integrity and availability can be provided to applications in the face of attacks.
With the aim to quantify the ITDB, Yu, Liu and Zang [18] and Wang and Liu [17] developed simple
CTMC models to evaluate the survivability of the ITDB. Especially, Wang and Liu [$1\eta$ formulated
two survivability measures; system integnity and rewarding availability1. In this paper we extend it to a
CTSMC model with non-exponentially distributed transition times, and provide more robust quantitative
framework to malicious attacks with a variety of probabilistic patterns.
Further, by introducing an additional control parameter called the switching time, we develop secure
control schemes of the ITDB, which maximize the security messures; system integrity and rewarding
availabUity, as well as the common system availability. Necessary and suﬄcient conditions to eXist a finite
and unique optimal switching time are derived under a mild parametric amumption. These analytical
results enable us to maximize the utihty of intrusion tolerance in the ITDB. Numerical examples are
devoted to examine the dependence of model parameters on the optimal switching time and its wociated
security measures. Throughout the sensitivity analysis on the model parameters, it is shown numerically
that the ITDB should be designed to minimize mission impact by $\infty ntaining$ both the intrusion and
failure. FinaUy, the paper is concluded with some remarks and future research directions.
1The integrity deflned in [17] seems to be somewhat different ftom the usual qualitative definition as a security attribute.
In this paper we call it the system $|ntq’\backslash ty$ which is a quantitative measure, and distinguish from the qualitative measure.
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Figure 1; Bssic ITDB architecture.
2. Intruslon Tolerant Database System
2.1. Basic Concept
First of all, we give a brief summary on the intrusion tolerant database (ITDB). In the ITDB, once it is
damaged &om any reason such as infections and attacks, the damaged $part8$ are automatically located,
contained and repaired as soon as possible, so that the database can continue being operative with the
intrusion tolerant functions. Figure 1 shows the major components of a compreheoive ITDB, which
was introduced in $[6, 7]$ . In a fashion similar to the reference [17], we $a1_{8}0$ focus on some significant
components; Mediator, Damage containment and Damage recovery, in Fig.1 and describe the stochastic
behavior of functions in major components. Mediator subsystem may function as a proxy for each
user transaction and transaction processing call to the databaee system, and enables to keep the useful
information on user transactions, such as $read/w\dot{n}te$ operations. This function $i_{8}$ quite important to
generate the corresponding logs for damage recovery and containment.
More precisely, in the traditional secure database system, the damage containment can not be made
until the data items are identified as damaged ones. In this situation, a signiflcant damage assessment
latency may happen, so that the damage caused by attacks or intrusions may propagate to the other data
items. In the ITDB, the so-called multi-phase damage containment technique is applied as an intrusion
tolerant technique [6], where it involves one containing phase and one more uncontaining phases referred
to as Containment relaxation. Once an intrusion is detected by Intrusion detector, Damage recovery
sukystem has the responsibility to the damage assessment and repair, and retrieves the malicious trans-
action messages reported from Intrusion detector. On the other hand, Damage containment $suky_{8}tem$
traces the damage propagation by capturing the dependent-upon relationship among transactions.
Hence, the control by Intrusion detector plays an central role to the design of the ITDB. Since
Intrusion detector is bssed on both the trails on the logs and some relevant rules to identify malicious
transactions, however, $it_{8}$ effect is lmited. In other words, it would be impossible to detect $aU$ the
intrusions automatically within the real time. In practice, two control modes can be ready; automatic
detection mode and manual detection mode, so that an automatic detection mode can be switched to
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Figure 2: Semi-Markov transition diagram
a manual detection mode if Intrusion detector does return no response during the real time operation.
Wang and Liu [$1\eta$ developed a simple CTMC model with random switching from an automatic detection
mode to a manual one, and evaluated the security measures for the ITDB.
2.2. Model Description
FollowingWang and Liu [17], we also focus on three components in the ITDB, Mediator, Damage recovery
and Damage containment systems. Suppose that the database system starts operating at time $t=0$ with
Normal State; $G$ . If attackers or hackers detect the vulnerability of the database, they try to attack the
database and the state may make a transition to Infection State; $I$ , where the transition time from $G$
to $I$ has the continuous cumulative distribution function (c.d.$f.$ ) $F_{G,I}(t)$ with mean $\mu_{G,l}(>0)$ . Once
the malicious attack by an attacker was successful in State $I$ , the intrusion detector begins operating
automatically. If the infection of parts or data items is detected in the automatic detection mode, the
state makes a transition from $I$ to Maintenance State; $M$ , where the transition time from $I$ to $M$ is given
by a random variable having the continuous c.d. $f$. $F_{I,M}(t)$ and mean $\mu_{l,M}(>0).$ . In this phase, when
the infected items are identifled more specifically through the damage assessor, the corrective recovery
operation is triggered in Recovery State; $R$ in the damage recovery system. Let the state transition
time from $M$ to $R$ be the random variable having the c.d. $f$. $F_{M.R}(t)$ and mean $\mu_{M,R}(>0)$ . After
the completion of recovery operation, the infected parts are fixed and the database system can become
as good as new with Normal State, where the completion time to recover the database is given by the
non-negative continuous random variable with the c.d.$f$. $F_{R,G}(t)$ and mcan $\mu_{R,G}(>0)$ .
On the other hand, it should be worth mentioning that the infection of parts or data items is not
always possible only in the automatic detection mode. In other words, the intrusion detection is not
always perfect for all possible attacks, so that the system manager $and/or$ the full vendor may search the
infected parts in the manual detection mode. Wang and Liu [$1\eta$ considered the possibUity of switching
from the automatic detection mode to the manual detection mode, and assumed that the switching may
occur randomly. This corresponds to the switching from the unconfinement executor to the confinement
executor. In [17], the associated stochastic model is based on a CTMC with exponentially distributed
transition times. Instead of the exponential switching time, we model the switching time by the non-
negative continuous random variable with the c.d.$f$. $F_{I,MD}(t)$ and mean $\mu_{I,MD}(>0)$ , where Manual
detection state is denoted by $MD$, and the damaged parts are contained manually within the ITDB.
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When the intrusion is detected, the system state makes transition from $MD$ to $MR$, and next the
recovery operation starts immediately. Finally, when the recovery operation is complete, the state makes
a transition from $MR$ to $G$ with Normal State. In this way, the same cycle repeats again and again over
an infinite time horizon. Since the underlying stochastic process is a CTSMC, it is noted that our model
is an extended version to the CTMC model in [17]. Figure 2 illustrates the state-transition diagram for
the CTSMC model.
In this context, the automatic detection mode is randomly switched to the manual detection mode.
Dissimilar to Wang and Liu [17], we introduce the time limit to turn on the manual detection, $t_{0}(0\leq$
$t_{0}<\infty)$ , periodically and call it the switching time. If the automatic detection is switched to the manual
detection, then the system state goes to $I$ from $MD$. Without any loss of generality, we define the
transition probability from $I$ to $MD$ by
$F_{I,MD}(t)=\{\begin{array}{l}(t\geq t_{0})0(t<t_{0})\end{array}$ (1)
This means that the detection mode can be switched from the automatic mode to the manual model at
every $t_{0}$ time unit.
3. Security Measures
3.1. System Integrity
Wang and Liu [17] defined the system integrity as a fraction of time when all accessible data items in the
database are clean. As mentioned previously in Section 1, the integrity is regarded as one of the most
typical security attributes in addition to authentication and non-repudiation. When the integrity is high,
the ITDS can serve the users by utilizing the good or clean data with high probability. In Fig. 2, all data
items in the ITDB are clean and accessible in State $G$ . When attacks occur, some data items $wiU$ be
affected and the part of accessible data items in state $I$ may be dirty. After the intrusion is identified, the
ITDB can contain all the damaged data until it finishes the repair process. In this situation, the ITDB
carries out the selective containment and repair, and is still available, so that the accessible data items are
clean during the containment, damage assessment and repair process. In Fig. 2, since the system states




Then, the problem is to derive the optimal switching time $t_{0}^{s}$ maximizing $AV(t_{0})$ . For the purpose, we
make the following parametric aesumption:
$(A\cdot 1)\mu_{MR,G}>\mu_{M,R}+\mu_{R,G}$ .
In (A-1), it is assumed that the time length to detect an intrusion automatically is strictly shorter than
that by the manual detection. This seems to be intuitively validated from the viewpoint of the utility in
automatic detection.




(i) If $q_{IN}(0)>0$ and $q_{IN}(\infty)<0$ , then there exists a finite and unique optimal switching
time $t_{0}^{*}(0<t_{0}^{*}<\infty)$ satisfying $q_{JN}(t_{0})=0$
(ii) If $q_{IN}(0)\leq 0$, then $t_{0}^{r}=0$
(lii) If $q_{IN}(\infty)\geq 0$, then $t_{0}^{*}arrow\infty$
(2) Suppose that the c.d.$f$. $F_{I,M}(t)$ is IHR under (A-1). If IN$(O)>IN(\infty)$ , then $t_{0}^{*}=0$ otherwise
$t_{0}^{l}arrow\infty$ .
The proof is omitted for brevity. For the actual management of database systems, it is more significant
to keep the clean and accessible data. So, when the quality of data is considered, the system integrity
should be the more attractive security measure than the $8y8tem$ availability.
3.2. Rewarding Availablllty
The system availability is defined as a &action of time when the ITDB is providing services to its users,
and does not care the quality of data. Since the ITDB perform the on-the-fly repair and will not stop
its service faced by attacks, it can be expected that the corresponding system avalability is nearly 100%
in almost all cases. For better evaluation of the security attribute in the ITDB, Wang and Liu [17]
considered another type of availability, called $re$warding availability, which is defined as a &action of time
when all the clean data items are accessible. If the clean data can not be accessed in the ITDB, it can be
regarded as a serious loss of service to users. Dissimilar to the system integrity, since the system states
under consideration are $G,$ $R$ and $MR$, the rewarding availabihty is defined by $RA(t_{0})=U_{RA}(t_{0})/T(t_{0})$ ,
where
$U_{RA}(t_{0})=\mu_{G,I}+\mu_{R_{*}G}F_{I,M}(t_{0})+\mu_{MR,G}\overline{F}_{I,M}(t_{0})$. (6)
We give the characterization result on the optimal switching time maximizing the rewarding availability
without the proof.
Proposition 2: (1) Suppose that the c.d.$f$. $F_{I,M}(t)$ is strictly DHR under (A-1). Define the function:
$q_{RA}(t_{0})=(\mu_{R,G}-\mu_{MR,G})r_{I,M}(t_{0})T(t_{0})$
$-[1+\{(\mu_{M,R}+\mu_{R,G})-(\mu MD,MR+\mu_{MR},c)\}r_{I,M}(t_{0})]U_{RA}(t_{0})$. (6)
(i) If qRA (0) $>0$ and $q_{RA}(\infty)<0$ , then there exist8 a finite and unique optimal switching
time $t_{0}(0<t_{0}<\infty)$ satisfying $q_{RA}(t_{0}^{*})=0$
(11) If $q_{RA}(0)\leq 0$ , then $t_{0}=0$
(iii) If $q_{RA}(\infty)\geq 0$, then $t_{0}^{*}arrow\infty$
(2) Suppose that the c.d.$f$. $F_{I,M}(t)$ is IHR under (A-1). If $RA(O)>RA(\infty)$ , then $t_{0}^{r}=0$ otherwise
$t_{0}arrow\infty$ .
In this section, we optimized the three security measures for the ITDB and derived the optimal switching
times for respective quantitative cniteria. In the foUowing section, we will give some numerical $\alpha ampl\alpha$,
and calculate the optimal switching policies and their associated security measures.
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4. Numerical $nlu\epsilon tratlo118$
4.1. Parameter Set
We focus on both the system lntegrity and the rewardlng availability, and treat the database management
system with Oracle St server in [17]. Although the security model in [17] was based on a simple CTMC,
we here assume that the c.d. $f$. $F_{I,M}(t)$ is given by the Weibull distribution with scale parameter $\eta$ and
shape parameter $m$ :
$F_{l,M}(t)=1-\exp\{-(t/\eta)^{m}\}$ . (7)
This assumption implies that the transition time from an intrusion to the containment sate is DHR
$(m\leq 1)$ or IHR $(m\geq 1)$ , and can represent the more general transition phenomena. When $m=1$, it
reduces to the exponential distribution with constant hazard rate. The other transition rates from state
$i$ to state $j$ are assumed to constant, $i.e.,$ $1/\mu:.j=\lambda_{i,j}(i,j\in\{G,I,M, R, MD, MR\}, i\neq j)$ , except
for $(i,j)=(I, M)$ . In particular, we introduce the attack hitting rate $\lambda_{\alpha}$ and the false alarm rate $\alpha$ as
Wang and Liu [17] did so. It should be noted that Intrusion detector in Fig. 1 $wiU$ waa the system
user of mahcious $attack/intrusioo$ as well as the system failure by means of a fake alarm. Let $T_{a}$ and
$\tau_{fa}$ be the intrusion time and the system failure time measured from time $t=0$ in State $G$ , and be the
exponentially distributed random vaniables with parameters $\lambda_{a}$ and $\alpha$ , respectively. Then the bction
$F_{G,I}(t)$ is regarded as the c.d.$f$. of the random variable $\min\{T_{a},T_{f^{a}}\}$ and is the exponentlal c.d.$f$. with
parameter $\lambda_{a}+\alpha$ . Table 1 presents the model parameters used in this example, where they are almost
same in [17]. We set $m=0.2$, and choose $\eta$ so as to satisfy $\mu_{I,M}=\eta\Gamma(1+1/m)$ .
4.2. System Integrity
kble 2 presents the maximized the system integrity for varying model parameters, where $t_{0}arrow\infty$ implies
the nomanual detection policy. IFYom this table, it is seen that the optimal control of the switchlng time
to the manual detection mode leads to the $2.8\%\sim$ 35.5% improvement of system integrity. In this
numerical example, it can be observed that the periodic switchlng to the manual detection mode and the
rapid $containment/repair$ bom the damage due to attacks or intrusions are quite important factors to
increase the system integrity. In Fig.3, we plot the behavior of the system integrity vith respect to the
attack hltting rate and the false alarm rate. IFVom this result, it can be seen that the system integrity
increases to 0.2%\sim 1.4% $(1.3x10^{-2}\%\sim 0.16\%)$ when the attack hitting rate (false alarm rate) decreases.
This result can be explained physically, so that the system integrity can increase if the total operation
time of the ITDB becomes longer with the lower attack hltting rate $and/or$ if the load of the ITDB with
the higher false alarm rate becomes smaller.
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4.3. Rewarding Availabillty
Similar to Subsection 4.2, we examine the dependence of model parameters on the optimal switching time
and its associated rewarding availability in Table 3. Rom this table, it can be found that the periodic
control on the switching to the manual detection mode enables us to increase the rewarding availability
up to 0.2%\sim 12.3%. As the detection speed becomes faster, it can be increased to 0.3%\sim 3.9%. Figure
4 shows the behaVior of rewarding availability on the attack hitting rate and the false alarm, where the
rewarding availability varies in the ranges of 27.2%\sim 32.8% and 1.7%\sim 3.2% for $\alpha$ and $\lambda_{\alpha}$ , respectively.
Thus, the attack hitting rate is more sensitive than the false alarm rate to not only the system integrity
but also the rewarding availability.
5. Concluslons
In this paper we have reconsidered an ITDB architecture in Wang and Liu [$1\eta$ and developed a CTSMC
to assess the security measures such as system availabUity, system integrity and rewarding availability.
Further, we have optimized the switching times for maximizing the above measures and given the optimal
design methodologies in terms of intrusion tolerance. In numerical examples, we have calculated the
optimal switching times and their associated security measures, and carried out the sensitivity analysis
on model parameters. As the lesson learned from the numerical examples, it has been shown that
the system integrity and the rewarding availability could be improved by controlling appropriately the
switching times to the manual detection mode.
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Figure 3: Behavior of system integrity with respect
to $\lambda_{a}$ and $\alpha$ .
Figure 4: Behavior of rewarding availability with
r\mbox{\boldmath $\theta$}\eta i to $\lambda_{a}$ and $\alpha$.
In the on-going research, we will evaluate quantitatively the other measures in survivability in the
ITDB. Since the survivability can be evaluated in the same framemork as performabihty [?, 10], the
CTSMC model developed in this paper can be still useful for the analysis with different measures. Also,
though we focused on only Mediator subsystem as a proocy for each user $tra$osaction and transaction
processing call to the database system, the other part on dynamic transaction processing such as the
database system itself may be included for modeling from the macroecopic point of view. Such an
integrated model should be developed by applying the semi-Markov analysis in the future.
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